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Abstract
We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model with o¢ ce-motivated parties and electoral outcome
uncertainty. We show that when all dominant parties (parties with positive probability of winning the
elections) have su¢ ciently good chances of winning, they agree to change the PR-rule with a more
majoritarian one in order to increase their chances of forming a single-party government. We identify
the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected
vote share of the smaller parties (parties with zero probability of winning). The necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for such collusion in favor of a majoritarian rule are: a) the high rents from a single-party
government, b) su¢ cient uncertainty over the electoral outcome. Our theoretical predictions regarding
the degree of the disproportionality of the electoral rule are supported by empirical evidence.
Keywords: electoral rules; disproportionality; seat premium; single-party government; uncertainty;
strategic coordination
JEL classication: D02, D72, H10
1 Introduction
Electoral rules, beyond their e¤ects on various aspects of social welfare (Hummel 2011; Persson, Roland
and Tabellini 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2006), also a¤ect the allocation of o¢ ce rents among competing
parties. This is so, because the distribution of parliamentary seats among parties is a signicant determi-
nant of relative political power (Blais 1991). As Duvergers (1954) law postulates, a proportional rule that
favors multi-partism will most likely result in a multi-party coalition government being formed. Therefore,
the spoils of the o¢ ce have to be shared among many parties. In contrast, under a more majoritarian
rule (e.g., rst-past-the-post) the winning party can more easily form a single-party government, thus
being able to enjoy the spoils of o¢ ce alone and advance its policy agenda without having to compromise
(Tsebelis 1999).
Since partiespayo¤s depend on the applied electoral rule, it follows that political parties have in-
centives to strategically choose an electoral rule which best serves their interests. That is, going in the
opposite direction, it is reasonable to expect that electoral rules themselves are also the result of strategic
decisions made by parties. For instance, Colomer (2005) argues that existing political parties tend to
choose electoral systems that allow them to consolidate and reinforce the current party-system instead
of changing it dramaticallyand concludes that political systems that are dominated by few parties tend
to establish majoritarian electoral rules.
Boix (1999) makes a similar point, suggesting that the existing variation in electoral rules across many
parliamentary democracies is due to the strategic decisions that ruling parties make in order to maximize
their representation in the legislature. Boix (1999) claims that if the electoral competition is less uncertain
and the existing electoral rule serves the current ruling parties then, the status quo is maintained as parties
have limited incentives to modify the electoral system. However, if the degree of uncertainty increases
the ruling parties will consider changing the current electoral rule depending on two conditions: Firstly,
the strength of the other parties, and secondly, the coordinating capabilities of the dominant parties.
In the same vein, Benoit (2004) studies the choice of electoral rules by rational, seat-maximizing parties
and codies the patterns of electoral rule change in various party-systems. According to this framework,
electoral rule change occurs endogenously when two conditions are met. First, it must be that all parties
favoring the reform should expected to score seat gains under the new rule. Second, those parties should
be able to muster enough votes in the current parliament in order to enact this change.
But, of course, it need not be that all parties share the same preferences over electoral rules. For
1
example small parties might prefer more proportional electoral rules to less permissive ones, since their
seat share under the latter is smaller than their vote share and the probability that they participate in
a government is very small since such systems regularly result in single-party governments.1 But what
about larger (or else dominant) parties? Can it be that all of them prefer a more disproportional (less
permissive) rule, or if one dominant party prefers a more disproportional rule (possibly because it is the
most likely winner of forthcoming elections) then the other dominant parties prefer a more proportional
one? That is, what are the incentives which can trigger this type of strategic coordination among dominant
parties in adopting a less permissive electoral rule and how are those incentives aligned in the presence
of electoral uncertainty in order to enable collusion?
The answer to these questions can help us to better understand both the rise in number of major
electoral reforms observed in the last two decades and also the increasingly less permissive (more majori-
tarian) nature of many of those reforms (Table 1). Until recently, the number of major electoral reforms in
advanced western democracies was particularly low and conned to some outlier countries (e.g., Greece).
For instance, Katz (2005) documents only fourteen incidents of major electoral reforms from the end of
World War II until the early 1990s. Moreover, the majority of electoral reforms that took place since the
beginning of the twentieth century were permissive in nature (Colomer 2004). Yet, after the early 1990s
the tide seems to have turned decisively, especially in those newly established democracies in east Europe
(Table 1). Not only is the occurrence of majoritarian reforms more frequent than it used to be in the past,
but at the same time majoritarian reforms appear to be the new norm.2 Given that those type of reforms
used to be rare in the past, what has changed during the last couple of decades and the frequency of
majoritarian reforms has increased over time? Furthermore, since in many of those instances (e.g., Italy
in 1999 and 2014; Taiwan in 2005; Lithuania in 2000; Poland in 1993; Romania in 2008 and 2012; Greece
in 2004) the majoritarian reforms have been sponsored by both dominant parties, what drives this type
of strategic coordination between dominant parties in choosing more majoritarian electoral rules?
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In order to address these new empirical regularities, we formalize the idea that it is parties that choose
the electoral rule. Building on existing literature of endogenous electoral rule choice, we consider a party-
system with two dominant parties (parties which have positive probability of winning the elections) where
1One exception can be the case of nationalist parties (e.g., Sinn Fein or the Scottish nationalists) which have territorially
concentrated electoral support and hence, they might also prefer the simple plurality rule.
2Riera (2013) also records 128 cases of major and minor electoral reforms from 1945 to 2010. More than a third of them
(46) were unambiguously majoritarian in nature. Moreover, two-thirds of those majoritarian reforms took place after 1990
in those newly established democracies.
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each party cares for its parliamentary seat share and for o¢ ce rents and where there is uncertainty over the
electoral outcome.3 In such a framework, we model electoral rule choice as a strategic decision made by
the parties through a parliamentary voting procedure and we study whether incentives of dominant parties
(as far as electoral reforms are concerned) can be aligned, thus enabling their coordination in altering
the rules of the game. Assuming that the current rule is a proportional one,4 we show that dominant
parties will agree in adopting a majoritarian rule if each of the two dominant parties has su¢ ciently good
chances of being the plurality winner of the next elections. We moreover characterize the exact degree of
disproportionality of this majoritarian rule: it is such that the plurality winner can always form a single-
party government. That is, the two dominant parties introduce a majoritarian rule which eliminates the
role that smaller parties would have otherwise played in a coalition government. What is perhaps more
important is that the degree to which the two dominant parties distort the proportional rule is increasing
in the expected cumulative vote share of smaller parties, or else, in the e¤ective number of parties. The
implications of our model nd strong support in our empirical and case-studies analyses.
We identify three main forces which are behind these results. First, parties strict preference for
a single-party government implies that an additional parliamentary seat increases their utility via two
channels. On the one hand, it can increase their bargaining power within a coalition, the number of
ministerial portfolios they hold and their control over the legislative agenda. On the other hand, it brings
them closer to the parliamentary majority threshold which they need to surpass in order to form a single-
party government and enjoy the perks of holding o¢ ce exclusively. That is, their desire for more seats
serves a greater end: it increases their chances of forming a single-party government. Hence, the marginal
utility of an extra seat is smaller when a party already commands the absolute majority in the parliament,
as the second channel disappears.
The second element is the introduction of electoral uncertainty. Uncertainty plays a key role in our
model by enabling collusion among dominant parties. In particular, when elections are competitive, domi-
nant parties might have a common interest to coordinate and adopt a less permissive (more majoritarian)
electoral rule in order to consolidate the status quo. The intuition is simple: without competitive elec-
tions, the sure loser will never agree to a more majoritarian electoral rule, since its chances of forming a
3As in Andrews and Jackman (2005), the term electoral uncertainty implies that elections are competitive and contested
by both dominant parties.
4Transitions from a majoritarian rule to a more proportional do not usually require any strategic coordination. Consider
the following case: under a majoritarian rule (such as FPTP) it is very likely that a single party commands the majority
in the parliament. Hence, if this party is expected to be the winner of the election the majoritarian rule is maintained
(or even reinforced). On the other hand, if the party is expected to lose and has the necessary votes to enact a reform a
more permissive electoral rule will be introduced. In both cases, electoral rule reform is the outcome of a single-agent payo¤
maximization programme without involving any strategic interaction (see Appendix B and also Ergun 2010).
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single-party government are zero. It is their strict preference for single-party governments in conjunction
with electoral uncertainty that triggers collusion, as we show.5 The latter, unlike Boix (1999) who claims
that electoral uncertainty prevents coordination, is found to be a sine qua non condition that aligns the
incentives of the two dominant parties, therefore enabling strategic coordination. Without formally mod-
elling electoral uncertainty it would have been impossible to explain the recent wave of transitions from
a more to a less permissive rule as the sure losers would always have incentives to block such reforms.
But, in addition to facilitating the strategic coordination among dominant parties, the introduction of
electoral uncertainty serves a more important purpose. It allows our model to address the substantive his-
torical implications of electoral reforms and speak to recent patterns and episodes of electoral rule change.
For it is the introduction of electoral uncertainty that allows us to focus on those relatively more rare,
but strategically non-trivial and thus more interesting, electoral reforms such as the recent majoritarian
transitions in east Europe and elsewhere. This is of particular interest, since most of the recent majori-
tarian transitions took place in new democracies where admittedly electoral uncertainty is expected to
be higher as the political environment is still volatile. Moreover, unlike many mature democracies where
major electoral reforms are less frequent (Katz 2005), experimentation over the choice of electoral rules
is more likely to occur in those countries that have experienced a recent democratic transition and need
to design those institutions anew. Hence, our choice to explicitly introduce electoral uncertainty not only
makes our model relevant for the study of the most recent (and more challenging) episodes of electoral
rule reform but, at the same time, it also highlights the mechanism (strategic coordination) which was
behind many of those majoritarian transitions.
The nal element is to consider a continuum of electoral rules that capture all possible degrees of
disproportionality (from pure PR to FPTP with a unique nation-wide district).6 To this aim we introduce
in the theoretical modeling the seat premium system. This rule allocates a fraction of the seats according
to PR while, the rest are given to the simple plurality winner as a premium.7 Hence, by varying the
amount of the premium we can simulate electoral rules with di¤erent degrees of disproportionality. This
5Here, we need to clarify that in our set-up, parties in favor of electoral rule reform, need only have expected utility gains
and not necessarily realized ex post seat gains (as in Benoit 2004). This is so, because partiesexpected utility incorporates
something more than mere seat gains: the increase in the probability of forming a single-party government, for the parties
favoring the reform. In the presence of electoral uncertainty this is utility enhancing for both, in expected terms.
6Fernández-de-Córdoba and Penadés (2009) also study the choice of electoral institutions (from a broad set of rules) by
parties that try to maximize the minimum number of seats for a given share of votes. Their analysis shows that the maximin
choice is the DHondt rule, generally equivalent to the Droop formula. The scope of our analysis is di¤erent as we focus on
dominant partiesincentives for strategic coordination, driven by their desire to form a single-party government.
7This type of proportionality distortion is an ordinary one as it gives a permanent advantage to the big parties (the largest
of which will always receive the premium). Hence, we also use the term plurality premium in order to stress the fact that the
simple plurality winner will always be entitled to the premium. Greece applies this electoral rule since the 2007 elections.
Another example of how this mechanism is applied are the 2006, 2008 and 2013 Italian legislative elections.
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allows our model to capture not only major (of which historically there have been a few) but also minor
electoral reforms which appear to be more frequent (Katz 2005).8 The reason that we have chosen to
model distortions of the PR rule using the plurality premium technology instead of introducing exclusion
quotas (or altering the district magnitude) is that these technologies tend to benet (in terms of seats)
both dominant parties, since they will surely be represented in parliament. Hence, their incentives to enact
a majoritarian reform are easily aligned (perhaps this is the reason that exclusion quotas are in place in
most countries). We, on the other hand, are interested in exploring whether both dominant parties can
actually agree to implement a majoritarian reform, such as the premium system, that only benets the
winner. Nevertheless, the way we model electoral reform is robust to alternative interpretations and can
also account for the e¤ects of small party entry on electoral rule choice.
2 The Model
2.1 Set-up and Preferences
Formally, we let N = f1; 2; 3g to be the set of parties who will participate in forthcoming elections.
All parties in N are assumed to be represented in the current parliament. Each party i 2 N holds a
proportion of seats s0i in the current parliament, such that
nP
i=1
s0i = 1. Moreover, parties have information
about each others expected vote share in the forthcoming elections. Party 3, is assumed to be a non-
winning party. That is, its vote share shall never exceed that of party 1 or party 2. The expectations on
future vote shares are formed by information that is commonly available to all parties. The vote share
of the non-winning third party is assumed to be xed at a level v3, whereas, the vote shares of the other
two parties are subject to uncertainty.9 Formally, the vote share of party 1 in the coming elections will
be modeled as a random variable:
v1 s , where  is a uniform distribution in [a1; b1]  [0; 1].10
It follows that, since v2 = 1  v1  v3; it must be the case that v2 2 [a2; b2] where a2 = 1  b1  v3 and
b2 = 1  a1   v3: These vote shares need to satisfy
nP
i=1
vi = 1 and v3 < ai, for all i 2 f1; 2g. That is, both
b1 and b2 are smaller than 1  2v3 and v3 < 1=3. We assume that 1 v32 2 (a1; b1) which means that each
of the two dominant parties has a positive probability of being the winner of the coming elections.
8By minor electoral reforms we mean small changes in the magnitude or in the boundaries of certain districts.
9Practically, our model can be viewed as a multi-party model if one interprets v3 as the sum of the vote shares of all other
parties. As long as v3 < minfv1; v2g our third party stands for the collection of all other small parties.
10The main results of this paper are also robust when one considers a more general class of distributions (), as we
explicitly show in the proof of Lemma 1 (Appendix A).
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As it will be evident in the analysis section, the way we chose to model uncertainty is a reduced form
of assuming that the vote share distribution fv1; v2; v3g is a random draw from a multivariate distribution
Z(v1; v2; v3) under the restriction that v3 < minfv1; v2g. That is, certainty about v3 is not required for
our results but improves signicantly the readability of the formal parts of the paper.
The share of seats that party i 2 N occupies in the new parliament will be dened as sli(vi); where
l will be the applied electoral rule. As stated before, we do not limit our attention to a single electoral
rule. Rather, we want to consider a wide range of electoral rules. In order to capture the big diversity of
electoral rules existing in the world we will adopt the following mechanism l that is based on a variation
of the PR rule with the use of a seat premium allocated to the rst party. That is, l is the proportion of
parliamentary seats allocated to the winning party as a premium (plurality premium). Depending on the




(1  l)vi , if vi < maxfvjg, for j 6= i
(1  l)vi + l2 , if vi = maxfvjg, for j 6= i
(1  l)vi + l , if vi > maxfvjg, for j 6= i
That is, the premium l is awarded to the (simple plurality) winner of the election.11 Given our
assumptions that v3 < 1=3 we have that v3 < minfv1; v2g < maxfv1; v2g. That is, the third party is never
entitled to this bonus as a result of never winning elections. In fact, much of those bonus seats are taken
from it. The above seat allocation mechanism allows us to capture a wide variety of electoral rules, from
pure PR to mixed systems and FPTP.12 The rst part is the proportional allocation of the seats minus
the reserved premium, whereas the second part is the bonus given to the winner. The utility of a party
i 2 N will be dened as:
ui(v1; v2; v3; l) =
8><>: s
l
i(vi) , if s
l
i(vi)  1=2
1 , if sli(vi) > 1=2
This formulation of utility captures the desire that parties have for single-party governments and the
smaller marginal utility of an extra parliamentary seat once a party has gained more than one half of the
seats. Yet, it is open to two main criticisms: Firstly, it is such that the marginal utility of an additional
11Note that in our model (with three parties) the threshold of awarding the bonus to the winner is (1   v3)=2 simply
because this is the threshold for plurality.
12To see this, consider the case of l = 0. Then, our electoral rule is pure PR, whereas in the case of l = 1, it transforms
into a FPTP system where the whole country is one district.
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seat for a party that already has a majority in the parliament is zero; and secondly, it suggests that
when a party cannot form a single-party government then its utility solely depends on its seat share
independently of whether it participates in a coalition government or if it stays in opposition.
In the Appendix we show that more general assumptions regarding o¢ ce rents (where parties can
receive rents, albeit smaller, if they participate in a coalition government) and the marginal utility of an
extra seat for a party has the majority in the parliament (which is again less than the marginal utility when
a party is in a coalition government or in opposition, but need not necessarily be zero) do not contradict
any of the forces that are crucial for our results. In fact, we show that those results are equivalent with
the simpler case that we exhaustively analyze in the paper.13 That is, our simplied preference structure
is a rough but fair approximation of more general preference structures.
2.2 The Game Structure
After dening the preferences of the parties, we proceed with the structure of the electoral reform game.
Formally, the game has three stages:
(i) The current rule is l = 0 (pure PR) and the party with the largest share of seats in the current
parliament shall bear the role of the proposer of an electoral reform (without loss of generality we assume
that the proposer is always party 1). That is, it will propose l 2 [0; 1].
(ii) Parties vote on the proposal l. If the votes in favor of the reform surpass a given threshold
W 2 [0; 1] (given exogenously by the constitution) then, the electoral reform proposal is accepted. In the
opposite case, if the proposal does not gather su¢ cient parliamentary support W , the electoral reform
is cancelled. That is, dening as l the rule according to which forthcoming elections will take place, we
note that l can be either the proposed l or 0 (which means that proposal l was defeated and the PR was
maintained).
(iii) Elections take place and each party obtains its new seat share in the parliament and computes
its utility according to its vote share and the applied electoral rule l.
13The formal proofs (Appendix A) and the analysis of the general case (Appendix B) will demonstrate that it is not the
constant nature of ui() for sli(vi) > 1=2 that drives our results, but the assumption that the gain from an extra seat should be




Since we have assumed that v3 is xed and common knowledge, there are two important thresholds as far
as the vote share of a dominant party is concerned. The rst one, (1  v3)=2, denes the necessary vote
share for a party to be the plurality winner and get the bonus, l. The second, 1=2 l1 l , is the vote share
that the rst party needs in order to get the majority of seats in the parliament and form a single-party
government given electoral rule l. Obviously, if (1  v3)=2  1=2 l1 l the plurality winner will automatically
have a majority in the parliament. We note here that the critical value of the bonus, l, at which these
thresholds become identical is v31+v3 ; that is (1   v3)=2 =
1=2 l
1 l , l = v31+v3 . Hence, for both i 2 f1; 2g,

























[vi(1  l) + l]dvi
#
if bi  1=2 l1 l













Bearing all these in mind we rst describe properties of these expected utility functions for the two
big parties in order to understand the nature of the choice problem that they face.
Lemma 1 For both i 2 f1; 2g and every admissible v3 the expected utility function Eui(l) is continuous
on [0; 1], convex on [0; v31+v3 ], strictly convex on a subset of [0;
v3
1+v3
] and decreasing on ( v31+v3 ; 1].
14
Lemma 1 implies that there are exactly two values of l that are candidates for maximum: either 0 or
v3
1+v3
. The trade-o¤ that a dominant party faces is the following: a larger l increases the probability that
this party forms a single-party government conditional on it being the plurality winner while it decreases
its parliamentary seat share conditional on it not being the plurality winner. The reason why Eui(l) is
decreasing in ( v31+v3 ; 1] for both i 2 f1; 2g is because any l larger than v31+v3 is such that the plurality
winner has a majority in the parliament and hence forms a single-party government with probability one
- a dominant party is essentially indi¤erent between l1 and l2, where v31+v3 < l1 < l2, conditional on it
being the plurality winner but it strictly prefers l1 to l2 conditional on it not being the plurality winner.
14All proofs are in Appendix A.
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The convexity between 0 and v31+v3 is due to the strong desire for forming a single-party government (see
Figures 1 and 2).
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
For expositional ease, we dene function fi(ai; bi; v3)  Eui(l = v31+v3 )   Eui(l = 0), which measures
the expected utility gains (or losses) for a party i 2 f1; 2g when there is a change in the electoral rule
from 0 to v31+v3 . For bi <
1
2 , simple algebra yields that:




(bi   1 v32 )(2  bi   1 v32 )  ( v31+v3 )(1 v32 + ai)(1 v32   ai)
i
Otherwise, for bi  12 , we have that:















Intuitively, fi()  0, means that Party i has good chances of winning the elections (to see this notice
that fi() is strictly positive, for bi  12) and hence, it prefers l = v31+v3 .15 That is, fi() measures the
di¤erence between the expected gain when l = v31+v3 (instead of l = 0) is applied and as a result, the winner
is able to form a single-party government and the expected loss from running second when l = v31+v3 is
applied instead of l = 0.
The nature of the partiesexpected utilities has an important implication as far as a modelling as-
sumption is concerned: it renders the structure of the bargaining process irrelevant. Given that we have
adopted a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining protocol, one might rightfully worry that our results will be
driven by this particular assumption that does not allow for counter-proposals. Whereas, this statement
would have been generically true in any other context, in this particular set up, enriching the bargaining
process plays absolutely no role: a) any reasonable mechanism should result to a majoritarian reform




larger than W and b) any reasonable mechanism should result to no reform when the current seat share
of the parties whose expected utility is maximized at v31+v3 is smaller than W .
Since the electoral rule determines the seat allocation for the parties and thus, their utility, the proposer
- party 1 - will propose an electoral rule l 2 [0; 1] such that, given the threshold W 2 [0; 1], maximizes its
expected utility. If W  s01 party 1 will propose l 2 [0; 1] such that l 2 arg maxfEu1(l)g: In other words,
if the current seat share of the proposer exceeds the required threshold for enacting an electoral reform,
the proposer faces an unconstrained maximization program.
15Notice that fi() is strictly increasing in ai and replace ai with v3 in the equation (since by assumption, we have v3 < ai).
Then, observe that for every v3 > 0 it is always true that fi() > 0.
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Proposition 1 Assume the electoral reform process is trivial (W  s01). Then, l = v31+v3 if and only if
f1(a1; b1; v3)  0, otherwise l = 0.
On the contrary, if W > s01 the proposer needs the support of at least one of the two other parties in
order to implement an electoral rule reform. Lemma 2 demonstrates the behavior of the third party in
such cases.
Lemma 2 The third party always prefers the PR rule (l = 0) to any other rule.
This lemma suggests that an electoral reform is possible only if W  1  s03 - this is what we will be
assuming for the rest of the paper. Hence, if W > s01 party 1 is required to secure party 2s consent in
order for an electoral rule change to take place. Party 1 in this case faces a constrained maximization
problem and it has to propose:
l 2 arg max fEu1(l) j s.t. Eu2(l)  Eu2(0)g
But is it possible that this maximization problem has an interior solution? That is, can a majoritarian
electoral rule be adopted when the consent of the other dominant party is required? Lemma 1 suggests
two things: a) the solution of the above constrained maximization problem is either 0 or v31+v3 and b)
v3
1+v3
is a solution of the above maximization problem if both f1(ai; bi; v3)  0 and f2(ai; bi; v3)  0.
When these conditions are satised, party 1 with the necessary consent of party 2, sponsors a majori-
tarian electoral rule reform (l = v31+v3 ). But is it even possible that these conditions are simultaneously
satised? That is can it be that both dominant parties consent to a majoritarian reform? It is natural to
expect that the expected winner wants such a reform. But could it be the case that the expected loser
also consents to it? The answer is yes, even in very asymmetric cases. Dominant parties have very strong
incentives to collude and pass a majoritarian reform. The reason is that introduction of a seat premium
increases the probability of forming a single-party government in the event of an electoral victory. This is
appealing not only for the party which is expected to win but for the party that is less likely to win as
well (as long as its chances of winning are not too small). We provide a simple illustration below.
Example 1 Let v1  U [0:44; 0:50], v2  U [0:40; 0:46] and v3 = 0:10. Then, both parties prefer l = v31+v3
to the PR rule.
In this example party 1 has a 5/6 chance of winning elections. Party 1 is the expected winner and
prefers l = v31+v3 to the PR (l = 0). What is easily checked is the fact that party 2 - the expected loser -
10
also prefers the majoritarian rule. To see this replace a2 = 0:40 and b2 = 0:46 and observe that condition




) > Eu2(l = 0). As a result, even with this high asymmetry over the distribution of votes, it
is still the case that party 2 strictly prefers the majoritarian rule v31+v3 . Next, we formalize the idea that
equal chances of victory are enough for a collusion among the dominant parties to take place.
Lemma 3 In the symmetric case (a1 = a2) both dominant parties always strictly prefer l = v31+v3 to l = 0.
The proposition that follows is actually a corollary of the above lemma. Since in the symmetric
case fi() > 0 for both parties and the inequality is strict, we can show that in asymmetric cases in
a neighborhood around the symmetric one the inequality still holds. Hence, the two dominant parties
should still have incentives to collude and implement a majoritarian reform.
Proposition 2 For every admissible a1 there exists z > 0 such that both dominant parties strictly prefer
l = v31+v3 to l = 0 if a1   a2 2 ( z; z).
Proposition 3 formalizes the main nding of the paper. In an environment of electoral uncertainty and
when the electoral reform is non-trivial, both dominant parties desire to implement the same majoritarian
reform conditional on both having su¢ ciently similar chances of winning the elections (as we saw in the
example above these su¢ ciently similar chances may in fact be very di¤erent). Hence this model helps us
understand not only major electoral reforms from PR to majoritarian systems but minor electoral reforms
too. If the vote share of the third party (v3) varies slightly between elections but electoral uncertainty is
high then, this model would predict that we should observe many minor changes in the disproportionality
of the electoral rule taking place.16
3.1 Testable Implications
An important implication of equilibrium uniqueness is that the value of the seat premium l = v31+v3 is such
that it always allows the winner to form a single-party government. That is, if the perks of o¢ ce are high
enough and if there is su¢ cient electoral uncertainty, o¢ ce motivated parties can agree to distort the PR
rule in order to consolidate the two-party system. Moreover, a simple comparative statics analysis on the
16This model could further be used to study transitions from less (l = v3
1+v3
) to more proportional (l = 0) rules too.
Since, there are only two candidate values of l for an optimum, in equilibrium it must be either l = 0 or l = v3
1+v3
. If the
proposer has enough seats to implement the reform single-handedly, which is usually the case when the a majoritarian rule
is the status-quo rule, the proposer will chooses the PR rule (l = 0) if it expects to lose the election with su¢ ciently high
probability. Otherwise, it picks l = v3
1+v3
, which allows it to form a single-party government in the event of an electoral
victory.
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equilibrium value of the seat premium, l(v3)  v31+v3 , reveals that proportionality distortion is increasing
in the electoral power of smaller parties (captured by v3 in our model). That is, @( v31+v3 )=@v3 > 0. This
prediction o¤ers an additional insight in the relationship between party-system fragmentation, new-party
entry and electoral rule reform. In essence, v3 is a proxy for the fragmentation of the party-system as the
ENP index is positively and monotonically related and v3, as long as v3 < 1=3.
First, let us understand by v3 the sum of vote shares of all other non-winning parties (assume there
are n such parties), except for the two most voted parties. Moreover, let us assume that the two most
voted parties parities -the dominant ones- are symmetric (they receive equal vote shares in expectation)
and that moreover the n smaller parties are symmetric as well (each of receives a vote share equal to
v). Then, the vote share of a dominant party is (1 nv)2 > v. Since nv = v3, it follows that
(1 nv)
2 > v
is equivalent to v3 < n2+n which is unambiguously true (that is, it is true for any n) if v3 < 1=3. In
party-systems which satisfy these conditions (two dominant parties and v3 < 1=3) our theory predicts
that l = v31+v3 ; in all other cases it may be the case that v3 has any other kind of e¤ects on the electoral
rule or it may not have any e¤ect at all.
Especially for the relevant range of the values of v3 < 1=3 and under the assumption presented above
(two big parties and n smaller ones) one can compute the E¤ective Number of Parties (ENP) index as




















It is then easily veried that @ENP@v3 > 0 and
@ENP
@n > 0 if v3 < 1=3.
17 This implies that we can
substitute v3 with the ENP index in our empirical estimation. Hence, our models prediction that for
v3 < 1=3 an increase in v3 should lead to a less proportional electoral rule (an increase in the size of
premium l) can be stated in terms of the ENP index which measures party-system fragmentation.
Hypothesis 1 If v3 < 1=3, an increasing ENP leads to a less proportional rule.
Our theory does not o¤er conclusive implications for the cases in which v3 > 1=3, which are undoubt-
edly many. This is why, its resulting hypothesis on the relationship between party-system fragmentation
and electoral rule disproportionality is a conditional one (stated only for v3 < 1=3). Hence, it does not
necessarily contradict Colomers unconditional hypothesis (2005) which states that an increase in the










fragmentation of the party-system (an increase in the ENP index) leads to more proportional rules. In
fact, our theory provides a rational choice explanation to the ndings by Riera (2013): as long as the
party-system is characterized by the presence of two dominant parties (that is, v3 < 1=3) our model
predicts that an increase in the vote share of smaller (non-winning) parties causes the adoption of less,
not more, proportional rules.
In the section that follows, we test this conditional hypothesis together with our main comparative
statics prediction on the size of the seat premium (l). In the Appendix, we will also present a series of
case-studies on recent majoritarian electoral rule reforms in order to examine more closely our equilibrium
mechanism (strategic coordination between dominant parties).
4 Empirical Analysis
In order to test empirically the predictions of our model we collect electoral and institutional data for 23
OECD countries for the period from 1960 to 2006 from two di¤erent sources: the Comparative Political
Data Set I (CPDS I) and the data archive used by Carey and Hix (2011).18 In total we have observations
from more than 300 elections for a period of almost fty years. To operationalize the measurement of
our dependent variable, the disproportionality (majority bias) of the electoral rule, we use the Losemore-
Hanby (LH ) index of disproportionality which measures the aggregate absolute deviations between seats










where vi;n;t is the vote share and sli;n;t is the seat share of party i in country n in election (year) t when
rule l is applied. The use of the Losemore-Hanby over the Gallagher index of disproportionality, which is
more commonly used in the literature, is due to the fact that the LH index ts our theory much better,
for it is indi¤erent to fragmentation among smaller parties and is consistent with our interpretation
of v3 as the aggregate vote share of small parties.19 Our model suggests that based on the degree of
disproportionality (measured by the Losemore-Hanby index) we should expect the distribution of applied
electoral rules to be concentrated around two clusters: when the index is equal to 0 (when there is no
18Detailed variables denitions and the codes for replicating our estimation results can be found in Appendix C.
19The squaring of deviations in the Gallagher index is intended to make it di¤erent when the third party is a single
party, as opposed to the situation (as in our model) where it is the aggregate of small parties. Hence, the Gallagher index
introduces a di¤erence where the model (and the Losemore-Hanby index) prefer to see equivalent situations. Nevertheless,
our ndings are robust to using the Gallagher index and additional results are available by the authors upon request.
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reform and l = 0 is applied), and when the index is around .095 (when l = v31+v3 is applied).
20 Preliminary
analysis of aggregate data from our sample seems to conrm this prediction (Fig. 3), despite the rough
approximation technique that we employ.
But, in addition to providing aggregate empirical evidence, we also estimate the full version of our






2, which measures the fragmentation of the party-system and the dispersion of electoral power
among parties, and the sum of vote shares of all non-dominant parties (what we call v3). Moreover, to
increase the t between our model and the empirical estimation we also introduce two control variables
in order to account for the competitiveness of the electoral race (degree of electoral uncertainty) and the
ability of parties to extract rents from holding o¢ ce: the margin of victory of the winning party and a
dummy variable indicating high institutional constraints, respectively. Formally, we estimate the following
equation (Model 1):21
LHn;t = 0 + 1ENPn;t +X
0
n;t   + n + t + "n;t (1)
where ENPn;t is the E¤ective Number of Parties index computed for country n in election t, n and
t are unit-specic(country dummies) and time-specic (year dummies) xed e¤ects and X0n;t is the set of
other control variables (margin of victory, constraints dummy, a dummy variable indicating frequency of
coalition governments, the number of parties participating in government, a dummy indicating whether
the regime is a presidential or a parliamentary democracy and the number of years that a country is an
established democracy).22 Given our models predictions and our conjecture we expect 1 > 0 if the sum
of vote shares of the remaining non-dominant parties is less than a third (recall that @ENP@v3 > 0, which
also implies @l(v3)@ENP > 0, for v3 < 1=3).
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 3 about here]
20Assuming symmetry, if one replaces the vote shares of dominant parties with their expected ones (E[vi] = 1 v32 )
and computes their seat shares sli(vi) as a function of the applied rule l (by Lemma 3 in the symmetric case we have
l = v3
1+v3
), after some algebra one can get the predicted Losemore-Hanby index for country n at election t which becomes:dLHn;t  v31+v3  = (v3)n;t2 . Since in our sample, the average vote share of third parties (other than the two major ones) is 0.19,
one can calculate the LH index for the symmetric case and obtain a value of 0.095.
21While most of the literature uses the ENP index our theoretical prediction is stated in terms of v3. One problem with
the ENP index is that it is not invariant to how v3 is distributed across di¤erent small parties. Hence, in order to address
this issue and increase the t between our theoretical and empirical predictions, we estimate again Model 1 by replacing
ENP with v3. This is done when we estimate Model 3 (Appendix B).
22The rationale for using those additional controls is similar to that of using the margin of victory and the high institutional
constraints dummy in order to control for electoral uncertainty, the size and the allocation of o¢ ce perks among di¤erent
parties and branches of the executive (which implicitly determines the value of a single-party government). Similarly, the
age of the democratic regime is a proxy for a more established (and perhaps more inclusive) democracy.
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First we estimate Model 1 using the full sample. Then, we restrict our sample to contain only those
cases where v3 < 1=3, as our theory dictates. The results of estimating (1) in both samples (results for the
full sample in odd columns) are presented in Table 2. In columns 1 and 2 we estimate a simpler version
of Model 1 without the inclusion of xed e¤ects, while in columns 3 to 6 we estimate the xed e¤ects
(FE) model. The results support our hypothesis, as in the restricted sample the coe¢ cient on ENP is
always positive and statistically signicant at any conventional level. They can interpreted as follows: an
increase in the ENP by one standard deviation is associated with a more than 1.5 standard deviation
increase in the disproportionality of the electoral rule, which implies that our results are also qualitatively
signicant. Moreover, when we compare those results with the ones obtained when the model is estimated
using the full sample, we observe that 1 either fails to be statistically di¤erent from zero (column 1) or is
a smaller in magnitude positive number. The latter follows from the fact that while the e¤ect of ENP on
electoral rule disproportionality is unambiguously positive when v3 < 1=3, whenever v3 > 1=3 our model
does not o¤er a conclusive prediction (it can also be negative). Hence, one can expect that the coe¢ cient
1 will drop in magnitude when the sample includes those observations.
Furthermore, in order to explore in more detail this conditional relationship between the ENP index
and the disproportionality of the electoral rule we estimate a variation of the previous model, where
instead of restricting the sample to those cases where v3 < 1=3, we interact the ENP variable with v3 (the
variable that measures the sum of vote shares of all non-dominant parties). That is, we formally estimate
the following equation (Model 2):
LHn;t = 0 + 1ENPn;t + 2ENPn;t  (v3)n;t +X0n;t   + n + t + "n;t (2)
where (v3)n;t is the sum of vote shares of all non-dominant parties in country n in election (year) t
and all other variables are as dened above. Again, we expect 1 > 0 but this time we also expect 2 < 0.
That is, the positive e¤ect of ENP on the disproportionality of the electoral rule is mitigated as v3 is
increasing. We present the results of estimating equation (2) in Table 3.23
Once more, the results we get are consistent with our models prediction. In all specications the
coe¢ cients on ENP (1) and the interaction term (2) have the expected signs and are statistically
signicant at the conventional level. We also get an analogous picture, when we look at the estimates of
23The expectation that 2 < 0 is also a direct implication of our theoretical model. Recall that we have shown @ENP=@v3 >
0 which implies that 2 =
@2LH
(@ENP )(@v3)





< 0. Moreover, since ENP and
v3 are monotonically related, we also estimate Model 2.b where we replace ENP with v3. In this case it is straightforward
to check that 2 =
@2LH
(@v3)2
should have the exact same sign with @
2l(v3)
(@v3)
2 < 0. We present those estimation results in columns
6 and 7 (Table 3).
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Model 2.b. That is, the initial e¤ect of ENP on disproportionality is positive (for low values of v3) and
gradually decreasing as the electoral power of the non-dominant parties is rising. We illustrate this point
in greater clarity in gures 4 and 5, where we plot the conditional (Fig. 4) and average (Fig. 5) marginal
e¤ects of ENP and v3 respectively, on the LH index of disproportionality for a given level of v3. In both
cases, observe that for all v3 < 1=3 the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the ENP (or v3) is unambiguously
positive and always statistically di¤erent from zero at the conventional 5% level, but is decreasing in v3
as expected (recall that the slope has the same sign with 2 < 0). Moreover, notice that for values of
v3 > 1=3 the e¤ect is not statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5% level (that is, it can also be
negative). Thus, the results of both models provide additional evidence in support of our comparative
statics prediction and our conditional hypothesis.24
[Insert Table 3 and Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 about here]
In sum, our empirical ndings yield adequate support to the comparative statics prediction of our
model. As our model suggests and our empirical ndings seem to verify, in any given political environ-
ment, there exist an optimal (from the perspective of dominant parties) electoral rule, which is chosen
strategically by them as a response to changes in the degree of political competition in order to maintain
their dominant position. If that is the case, in party-systems with two major parties, we should observe
some convergence between the actual and the predicted degree of electoral rule disproportionality. In
fact, we do observe such a convergence (Fig. 6) when we plot the actual Losemore-Hanby index of dis-
proportionality against the predicted one (recall that in the symmetric case dLHn;t = (v3)n;t2 ). Moreover,
in addition to presenting only aggregate measures of tness, we also estimate the complete model and
present the results in Appendix B. In gure 7 we present a visual summary of those results.
5 Final Remarks
Our analysis has so far demonstrated that increased political competition (e.g., a rise in electoral un-
certainty or new-party entry) may not always lead to more political representation (via more permissive
electoral rules). Yet, there might be an additional factor that can inuence the choice of electoral rules,
ideology. Until now, the literature on electoral rule reform has solely focused on seat-maximizing parties,
24Note that the statement regarding the threshold is not biconditional. That is, while v3 < 1=3 always implies that the
two dominant parties are never threatened by any of the other parties the converse statement is not necessarily true as this
depends on how v3 is distributed among the other parties. That is why we get a clear positive (and decreasing) e¤ect when
v3 < 1=3, but we do not get a clear prediction when v3 > 1=3.
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omitting completely from the discussion this additional dimension.25 Moreover, the static nature of these
models (including ours) raises some questions regarding the dynamic stability of the equilibrium electoral
rules. Although we do not aspire to conduct an exhaustive analysis on the e¤ect of ideology in the choice
of electoral rules, we briey discuss below how endowing parties with well-dened preferences over ideol-
ogy (in a left-right dimension) can under certain conditions guarantee the dynamic stability of electoral
rules, thus o¤ering some useful insights on the role of ideology in the design of electoral institutions.
If parties know that the electoral rule that they will design will be relatively long-lived, then the
uncertainty that we assume about the next elections can be easily interpreted as the distribution of the
expected outcomes for the many elections that will take place under a certain electoral rule. Moreover, in
this dynamic context, the symmetric scenario (the scenario in which both parties are expected to win the
next election with equal probability) can be interpreted as if each one of the two major parties is expecting
to win half of the times during the period in which this electoral rule will be applied. For instance, in
most of the countries in our sample, each of the two largest parties won approximately half of the elections
in any arbitrary long period. In such a framework, incentives for strategic coordination over adopting a
more majoritarian rule may conict with ideological di¤erences between the two dominant parties. For
example, if at the time of the electoral rule choice the ideologies of the two major parties diverge, then it
seems more plausible that they will choose PR over a more restrictive (majoritarian) rule. The intuition
is that, by sticking to a purely proportional rule, dominant parties can utilize the PR as an insurance
device against the risk of having of a single-party government being formed by a polar-opposite party.
That is, extreme ideological divergence can potentially cancel o¤ any incentives for strategic coordination
which we have identied. But, in turn, when parties compete under a PR rule they tend to adopt highly
polarized political platforms (Cox 1990; Calvo and Hellwig 2011).26
On the other hand, if at the time of electoral rule choice the two major parties exhibit ideological
proximity (as we have implicitly assumed in this paper), then they choose a majoritarian electoral rule,
and when parties compete under majoritarian electoral rules they tend to adopt more convergent plat-
forms (this holds especially for major parties; see Calvo and Hellwig 2011). So, we observe that two
dynamically stable paths arise: PR leads to platform polarization and platform polarization leads to PR
while majoritarian systems lead to platform convergence and platform convergence leads to majoritarian
25The e¤ect of electoral rules on ideological divergence (polarization) has been thoroughly examined both theoretically
(e.g., Cox 1990) and empirically (e.g., Bertelli and Richardson 2008; Calvo and Hellwig 2011). Our approach di¤ers from in
the following sense: we are interested in the reverse direction of the relationship between ideological divergence and electoral
rule disproportionality.
26Cox (1990) shows that centripetal incentives are stronger in majoritarian systems while proportional systems are domi-
nated by centrifugal incentives.
17
systems. Then, adding ideology suggests that a third - and perhaps dominant over the other two (suf-
cient electoral uncertainty and the desire to form a single-party government) - condition might a¤ect
the prospect of strategic coordination among dominant parties in adopting a more majoritarian rule and
consolidating the status quo. Hence, exploring how ideology interacts with partiesstrategic considera-
tions in the choice of electoral rules might help us understand why electoral rules in many established
democracies are relatively stable overtime and why major electoral reforms were (at least until the early
1990s) relatively rare (Katz 2005) and mostly permissive in nature (Colomer 2004). Yet, we defer those
questions for future research.
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Figure 1. Expected Utility as a function of l for i ={1, 





Figure 2.  Expected Utility as a function of l for i ={1, 






Figure 3. Actual electoral rule disproportionality 
(Losemore-Hanby Index) across OECD countries 
(1960-2007). 
 
Figure 4. Conditional marginal effect of ENP on the 
disproportionality of the electoral rule (Losemore-
Hanby index) for different levels of v3 
 
 






Figure 5. Average marginal effects of v3 on the 
disproportionality of the electoral rule (Losemore-
Hanby index). 
 
Figure 6. Predicted vs. actual electoral rule dispro-
portionality (Losemore-Hanby index): Aggregate  
data from 17 OECD countries. 
 
 
Figure 7. Estimating the fit of predicted electoral rule disproportionality (Losemore - Hanby index). 
 
























2005 MMM Plurality premium Majoritarian 
France (1) 
 
1958 List-PR Majority w/ run-off Majoritarian 
France (2) 
 
1987 List-PR Majority w/ run-off Majoritarian 
Greece (1) 
 





2004 Reinforced-PR w/ 3% 
quota 
Plurality premium Majoritarian 
Japan 
 
1994 SNTV MMM Majoritarian 
Venezuela 
 
1993 List-PR MMP Ambiguous 





2014 List-PR MMM Majoritarian 
Romania (1) 
 
1992 List-PR List-PR w/ 3% quota Majoritarian 
Romania (2) 
 
2000 List-PR w/ 3% quota List-PR w/ 5% quota 




2008 List-PR w/ 5% quota 
(10% for coalitions) 
MMM Majoritarian 
Romania (4) (b) 
 
2012 MMM FPTP Majoritarian 
Bolivia 
 
1994 List-PR MMP Majoritarian 
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1993 List-PR (Hare-Niemeyer 
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1993 FPTP MMM Permissive 
Georgia 
 
1992 List-PR MMM Majoritarian 
Hungary 
 
2012 MMP (w/ run-off for 
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1996 MMM (w/ run-off for 
SMDs and 4% quota) 
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2000 MMM (w/ run-off for 
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Notes: (a) Israel maintained its list-PR with a single nation-wide district but the reform introduced the direct 
election of the PM which necessitated the use of a majoritarian formula, thus making the system effectively 
mixed; (b) Electoral reform was approved by both Romanian legislative chambers (May 2012) with the support 
of the two biggest parties but was subsequently rejected by the Constitutional Court. 
 
TABLE II.  THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES INDEX ON THE 
DISPROPORTIONALITY  OF THE ELECTORAL RULE
Dependent Variable Electoral Rule Disproportionality measured by the Losemore-Hanby index 
Model 1
OLS OLS FE FE FE FE
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effective Number Parties (ENP)  0.001 0.049 0.012 0.060 0.010 0.070
(0.005) (0.018)** (0.005)** (0.011)*** (0.004)** (0.014)***
Margin of electoral victory (in %) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other controls? Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Fixed effects? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size Full v3<1 /3 Full v3<1 /3 Full v3<1 /3
R2 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.58 0.29 0.59
N 285 151 302 160 285 151
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level reported in parentheses. Unit (country) and time (year) specific fixed effects were included in  
the specifications of columns 3 to 6. Other controls include: a dummy variable indicating a country with high institutional constraints (see Comparative  
Political Data Set I for a detailed definition), a dummy variable indicating whether a country has a tradition of coalition governments and a dummy 
variable indicating the type of democratic regime (parliamentary vs. presidential). 
TABLE III.  THE CONDITIONAL (ON THE CUMULATIVE VOTE SHARE OF “THIRD” PARTIES - v3 ) EFFECTS OF A 
CHANGE IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES ON THE DISPROPORTIONALITY OF THE ELECTORAL RULE
Dependent Variable Electoral Rule Disproportionality (measured by the Losemore-Hanby index)
Model 2 Model 2.b
OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 0.035 0.026 0.018 0.028 0.022 -.- -.-
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)** (0.009)*** (0.010)**
ENP * v3 -0.041 -0.014 -0.007 -0.018 -0.011 -.- -.-
(0.008)*** (0.007)** (0.008) (0.009)** (0.010)
Sum of non-dominant parties vote shares (v3) -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.270 0.275
(0.076)*** (0.086)***
v3  - Squared -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -0.242 -0.229
(0.087)*** (0.099)**
Additional controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? No No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.10 0.12 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.15 0.29
N 300 300 300 248 248 248 248
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, reported in parentheses. A variable indicating the margin of electoral victory (in %) and a 
dummy variable indicating whether a country has  high institutional constraints  (see Comparative Political Data Set I for a detailed definition) are 
included in all specifications throughout columns 1 to 7. Additional controls (in columns 4 to 7) include: a dummy variable indicating whether a country  
has a tradition of coalition governments, the number of political parties participating in the cabinet/government, a dummy variable indicating the type of  
democratic  regime (parliamentary vs.  presidential  system) and  a variable measuring  the  number of  years  that  a  country has  been an  established  
democracy.
6 Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1. We only need to prove the result for i = 1. Then, the arguments are equivalent for party 2.
First consider the case of the uniform distribution. If b1 < 1=2, then there exist l^ 2 (0; 1) s.t. 1=2 l^1 l^ = b1:
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One can observe that: @
2Eu1(l)
@l2
= 0, for l 2 [0; l^]; @2Eu1(l)
@l2
> 0 for l 2 (l^; v31+v3 ]; and
@Eu1(l)
@l < 0 for
l 2 ( v31+v3 ; 1]: Moreover, if
@Eu1(l)
@l  0 for l 2 [0; l^] then, @Eu1(l)@l > 0 for l 2 (l^; v31+v3 ]: That is, Eu1(l)
is convex in [0; v31+v3 ], strictly convex in a subset of [0;
v3
1+v3
] and decreasing in ( v31+v3 ; 1]: If b1 > 1=2; for





























Just as before @
2Eu1(l)
@l2
> 0 for l 2 [0; v31+v3 ], and
@Eu1(l)
@l < 0 for l 2 ( v31+v3 ; 1]: That is, Eu1(l) is strictly
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Observe again that for l 2 [0; l^], we have @2Eu1(l)
@l2




2(l   1)0(2l 12l 2) + 00(2l 12l 2) < 0, while for l 2 ( v31+v3 ; 1] we have
@Eu1(l)
@l < 0. Given that
@Eu1(l)
@l < 0 for
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l 2 ( v31+v3 ; 1] the equilibrium electoral rule bonus for any () is always smaller or equal to v31+v3 . Moreover,
it is easily checked that a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the inequality 2(l   1)0(2l 12l 2) +
00(2l 12l 2) < 0 to be satised is for the density of () to be weakly concave (or at least not too convex). It
is, then, easily checked that this su¢ cient condition is satised by any distribution with a linear density
(independently of whether it is increasing or decreasing), the truncated Normal, the truncated Beta, the
semicircle and other distributions. Hence, we have shown that for a large class of ()s expected utility
is convex in [0; v31+v3 ]. Then in those cases as well, the results are guaranteed to be identical to the case
of uniform () that we analyze in the paper. That is, that the only values of l that are candidates for
maximum are either 0, or v31+v3 . This concludes the proof.
Proposition 1. When the electoral rule reform is trivial then this implies that the proposer faces
an unconstrained maximization problem. Hence for a change of the electoral rule from 0 to v31+v3 it
su¢ ces to show that Eu1(l = v31+v3 ) > Eu1(l = 0), that is f1(a1; b1; v3) > 0, which in turn implies that
(b1  1 v32 )(2  b1  1 v32 ) > ( v31+v3 )(1 v32 +a1)(1 v32  a1). In the reverse direction, assume that the above




) < Eu1(l = 0), a clear contradiction. The only if part follows.
Lemma 2. Since the third party expects to receive the premium l with probability zero, it strictly
prefers the PR rule (l = 0). Its expected utility from any electoral rule l 6= 0 is Eu3(v3; l) = v3(1   l),
which is strictly decreasing in l:




2 . In such a case it
can be easily checked algebraically that fi() = 1+2ai+v3(3+4v3)4(1+v3) > 0 for every bi < 12 ; for i 2 f1; 2g (for
bi  12 we know that fi() > 0 independently of whether we are in the symmetric case or not).
Proposition 2. Notice that we can always nd  such that we can rewrite ai = a i + . Then,
bi = 1   a i   v3 = 1   ai   v3 + , for i 2 f1; 2g. Again we assume that bi < 12 because otherwise
fi() > 0 trivially holds. Now, we can express condition fi(ai; bi; v3) > 0 in terms of ai,v3 and , where 













But, observe that in the symmetric case ( = 0) the above condition becomes 1+2ai+v3(3+4v3)4(1+v3) > 0
which is always satised, since the LHS is strictly positive for any ai, v3 (Lemma 3). Hence, by continuity
of fi() in , we can always nd z > 0 such that for every  2 ( z; z), fi() is strictly positive, even if i is





ui(v1; v2; v3; l) =
8>>>><>>>>:
sli(vi) , if s
l
i(vi)  1=2  sl3(v3)
sli(vi) + r1 , if 1=2  sl3(v3)  sli(vi)  1=2
gsli(vi) + r2 , if s
l
i(vi) > 1=2
where 0  r1 < 12 + r1 < r2 and g 2 [0; 1] and that a1 = a2 < 12 < b1 = b2 (symmetric parties). That
is, the utility function analyzed extensively in the paper is directly derived from the above formulation if
one sets r1 = g = 0 and r2 = 1.
The rst part is the utility of party i when it stays in opposition and some other party forms a single-
party government. In this case, is utility depends only on the number of its seats. The second part is the
utility of party i when no party can form a single-party government and as a result, a coalition government
is formed. Thus, on top of its seat share party i receives extra rents r1 from holding o¢ ce. Finally, the
third part gives the utility of party i when it forms a single-party government. In this case, the payo¤
of the party depends, as before, on its seat share and on o¢ ce rents r2 (which are obviously higher than
the rents i gets in a coalition government). Parties in this environment care about forming a single-party
government (12 + r1 < r2). Moreover, g 2 [0; 1] implies that the utility from an extra seat when the party
is not able to form a single-party government (sli(vi)  1=2), is generically higher than the utility from an
extra seat when the party is able to form a single-party government.27 Figure 10 (Appendix B) depicts
such a utility function.
Further notice that sli(vi) = vi(1  l) when vi < (1  v3)=2, sli(vi) = vi(1  l) + l2 when vi = (1  v3)=2
(parties 1 and 2 split the bonus when they tie) and that sli(vi) = vi(1   l) + l when vi > (1   v3)=2:
Therefore, the expected utility of party 1 (since parties 1 and 2 are symmetric we derive the outcome of




















[g(v1(1  l) + l) + r2]dv1]
27A party derives utility from an extra seat in two ways: directly, and indirectly (by increasing its chances of forming a
single-party government). Once its seat share exceeds the parliamentary majority threshold, the second channel disappears.
Hence, the marginal utility of an extra seat might decrease.
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[g(v1(1  l) + l) + r2]dv1]:
We compute:






















Moreover we observe that @Eu1(l)@l < 0 for l >
v3
1+v3
occurs if and only if:
g <  3+2b1+3v3 3+2b1 v3 :
That is, for su¢ ciently high r2 (su¢ ciently high rents from forming a single-party government) and
for su¢ ciently low g (su¢ ciently low gain from an extra seat when the party already has a majority of
votes in the parliament) both parties maximize their expected utilities by applying the l = v31+v3 electoral
rule.
To conclude let us state that there are three more possibilities. For r2 su¢ ciently low the most
probable outcome is that parties will choose l = 0 (PR). There is a very small set of parameter values,28
given by:
7+8b1 4b21+g 8b1g+4b21g+4v3 8b1v3 4v23
4 < r2 <
7+8b1 4b21+g 8b1g+4b21g+26v3 8b1v3 6gv3+7v23 3gv23
4+8v3+4v23






Finally, in the extreme case where both r2 and g are very large, the rst-past-the-post electoral rule
(l = 1) may be selected by the parties.
28This claim is derived from parametric analysis using Mathematica.
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7.2 Insu¢ cient Electoral Uncertainty
When the electoral competition is trivial we can state the following results.
Proposition 3 When both the electoral reform process and the electoral competition are trivial and the
proposer is: (i)the leading party, then l  maxf0; 1=2 a11 a1 g, (ii) not the leading party, then l = 0.
Proof. Since the electoral reform process is trivial, Party 1 faces an unconstrained maximization program.
Moreover, since the electoral competition is trivial, if it is the leading party, its expected utility is given








dv1]. Then, it proposes l such that it secures with
certainty the majority of the seats in the new parliament. That is, it sets a1 (1   l) + l = 1=2, which
implies that sl







v1(1  l)dv1], which is strictly decreasing in l. Hence, l = 0. This completes the proof.
This result can be viewed as the simplest case scenario. The idea behind this proposition is very simple.
Since the electoral reform process is trivial, the proposer holds enough seats in the current parliament
to enact any electoral rule reform, without the consent of Party 2. Hence, the proposer just chooses l
in order to maximize expected utility. Given that the electoral competition is trivial, if the Proposer is
not the leading party (i.e. sure loser) it proposes that the PR rule is not amended (l = 0). As a result,
the electoral rule does not change. Otherwise, it proposes l  maxf0; 1=2 a11 a1 g. That is, if Party 1 is
the leading party (i.e. sure winner), the proposed proportionality distortion l will be such that it will
guarantee the formation of a single-party government by Party 1. The solution to this unconstrained
maximization problem yields with certainty the majority of the seats in the parliament for every possible
realization of a1. Hence, by choosing this level of l the leading party ensures the highest possible level
of utility. On the other hand, if it is not the leading party it can never get the premium l, making its
utility strictly decreasing on l. Hence, any distortion to the PR rule is not desirable.
Proposition 4 When the electoral competition is trivial but the electoral reform process is non-trivial,
then l = 0:
Proof. Since electoral competition is trivial one party is a sure loser and the other is a sure winner.
That is, for i = 1 or 2, Eui(l) = 1(b1 a1) [
b1R
a1
vi(1  l)dvi], which is strictly decreasing in l. Hence, one party
always prefers l = 0 but the other, as shown in Proposition 4 prefers l  maxf0; 1=2 a11 a1 g. Since the
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electoral reform process is non-trivial, the two parties have to agree on the electoral reform. So, the only
equilibrium is l = 0.
The idea that drives the result is that in this case there is no room for collusion. The strategic
incentives of the two dominant parties do not align, because there is no uncertainty over the outcome
of the electoral competition. The leading party will always prefer a value of l > 0 but the other party
will always reject this proposal because its utility is strictly decreasing in l: Since the electoral reform is
non-trivial and requires the consent of both dominant parties, it is obvious why no electoral rule reform
will ever be enacted by this parliament. That is, the status-quo is maintained and PR persists as the
electoral rule (i.e. l = 0).
7.3 Additional Empirical Results: Goodness of Fit
In the paper we have presented some aggregate level evidence in support of the goodness of t between our
theoretical predictions and the actual data. Despite this being only a rough approximation, since it is true
that in some countries the two dominant parties have not been historically perfectly symmetric in terms
of their vote shares, the t of the predicted Losemore-Hanby index against the actual disproportionality of
the electoral rule appeared to be quite good. Here, we estimate the complete model on the full sample that
contains individual observations (at the country-year level). That is, we estimate the following equation
(Model 3):
LHn;t = 0 + 1dLHn;t +X0n;t   + n + t + n;t (3)
where dLHn;t is the predicted value of the LH index of disproportionality (and under the assumptions
specied above was calculated to be equal to
(v3)n;t
2 ) for country n in election t and all the other variables
are as dened above. Here, it may worth noting that the above specication is directly analogous the
specication of equation (1) once we replace ENP with v3. This is so, because the predicted dLHn;t index
(which we use as our independent variable in the equation above) is clearly a strictly and monotonically
increasing function of v3 and, moreover, it does not vary in the way that the v3 is distributed among
smaller parties.29 As a result, Model 3 is a direct substitute for Model 1.
By observing equation (3) it becomes apparent that a perfect t of our calibrateddLHn;t to the actual
data would imply a coe¢ cient value for 1 = 1, controlling for everything else. We present these results
29Recall that, in the symmetric case, our model predicts that l = v3
1+v3
and by replacing this value to the Losemore-Hanby




. Then, we can substitute v3 with the sum of vote shares of the
remaining non-dominant parties in country n in election t, in order to obtain a predicted value for dLHn;t.
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in Table 4 (Appendix B). In all specications (especially so, when v3 < 1=3) there is a positive and
statistically signicant (at any conventional level) correlation between the predicted and the actual values
of the LH index (the coe¢ cient ranges from .043 to almost 1). Moreover in columns 3, 5 and 7 when
we restrict our attention to the sub-sample where v3 < 1=3 (recall that we have implicitly assumed
v3 < 1=3 when we calculated dLHn;t for l = v31+v3 ) the estimate of the t is statistically indistinguishable
from one (ranging from 0.74 to 0.97) at any conventional level of signicance. In fact, if one looks at
the visual summary of our results (Fig. 7) it becomes clear that the predicted LH index is statistically
indistinguishable from the actual index (that is, the value of 1 is not statistically di¤erent from one)
in almost all specications.30 Hence, we conclude that the goodness of the t is satisfactory not only at
the aggregate but also at the individual (country-year) level. In sum, the comparative statics exercise
that we have conducted above we has shown that (in equilibrium) the perturbations on the degree and
the direction of the disproportionality of the electoral rule, measured by the Losemore-Hanby index, are
consistent with the predictions of our formal model.
7.4 Case-study Analysis
In order to identify whether empirical patterns of electoral rule change t our models description, we will
examine a series of case-studies.
7.4.1 Greece
We will rst examine the case of recent electoral reforms in Greece. Greece underwent four major electoral
rule reforms in the period under consideration, namely in 1988, 1991, 2004 and 2006. Table 5 (Appendix
B) presents the actual electoral results, the vote and seat share allocations, the actual plurality premium,
~l,31 and the predicted one (l = v31+v3 ). We also report the observed deviations between the actual and the
predicted values. In fact, our model seems to perform quite well in predicting the direction of electoral
rule change in Greece. As one can observe in Figures 8 and 9 (Appendix B), from 1981-1985 the actual
electoral rule is more disproportional than the optimum. Yet, the rst electoral reform (1988) introduces
the PR rule which results in more proportionality than it desired by the dominant parties. As a result,
another reform follows (1991) that makes again the rule more majoritarian. During the third electoral
30Moreover, note that when v3 < 1=3 the predicted values of the LH index are always positive and statistically di¤erent
from zero (at any conventional level).
31Our model can accommodate a continuum of electoral rules based on their disproportionality. One need only compute
~l = ~s1 ~v1
1 ~v1 in order to nd the actual premium
~l, which corresponds to the value of the premium when we allow the actual
seat allocation to be replicated by our model.
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reform (2004), which was rst applied in the 2007 elections, a 40-seat plurality premium is introduced,
quite close to the predicted optimum. Finally, Greek Parliament amended the rule in 2006 introducing
a 50-seat premium, in accordance with the theoretical predictions of the model. Moreover, with the
exception of the 1989 elections where a more permissive rule was applied, the observed gap between the
actual and optimal plurality premium is shrinking over time. Overall, we observe that the actual and
predicted values are moving in the same direction and do not di¤er signicantly from each other. That is,
both dominant parties in Greece have been quite strategical in choosing the rightelectoral rule, in order
to consolidate the bipartisan system and avoid political power-sharing with smaller parties (single-party
governments).
Furthermore, the permissive reform of 1988 provides further justication on our decision to focus on
restrictive reforms which are non-trivial in terms of strategic coordination. Back in 1998 it was widely
accepted that the conservative opposition will win the forthcoming 1989 elections by a signicant margin
over the socialist government. As a result the socialists which enjoyed a comfortable majority in the 1988
parliament single-handedly passed a permissive electoral reform (introducing pure list-PR) in order to
mitigate their expected loss in seats. Nevertheless, this electoral reform, which is also consistent with our
models predictions is a trivial one, both in terms of the process and also with respect to the electoral
competition. As a result, it boils down to a simple utility (seat) maximization problem that a single party
faces (see Proposition 1).
7.4.2 Poland
But in addition to Greece, which admittedly has one of the most uctuating electoral system among the
advanced OECD countries, we also examine additional cases of electoral rule reform in newly-established
democracies in east Europe (e.g., Poland, Lithuania) where many of the most recent reforms have taken
place. For instance, the restrictive electoral reform in Poland that took place in 1993 is a good example
to illustrate our theory.32 As Benoit and Hayden (2004) document the decision of the Polish parliament
to replace the list-PR rule (applying the Hare formula which is deemed to be the most proportional) with
a list-PR rule that applied the dHondt formula (less proportional) and introduce a 5% exclusion quota
(reaching up to 8% for coalitions) was mainly driven by the strategic coordination and calculations of
the two biggest parties (the Democratic Union/UD, a pro-Solidarity liberal party, and the Alliance of
32Benoit and Hayden (2004) provide a very detailed account of all the episodes of electoral reform in Poland in the early
1990s. They analytically show, by compiling data on actual and expected (by collecting a series of public opinion surveys
before the election) electoral and parliamentary strength for each party, that electoral reform in Poland was driven by
opportunistic seat-maximizing parties.
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Democratic Left/SLD, a second-generation post-communist party) which where polling high and where
expected to do well in the forthcoming elections, thus maintaining their dominant position.
Moreover, the near-change of the electoral rule in 1997 o¤ers additional support to our model. This
failed attempt to introduce a more permissive electoral rule was blocked by the strategic coordination
between the two dominant parties, the Alliance of Democratic Left/SLD and the Solidarity Electoral
Action, which coalesced despite their obvious political di¤erences in order to maintain the current status-
quo that suited their interests (the Alliance was the largest party in the current Parliament and its
support was steadily rising and so did support for the Solidarity which was also expected to do equally
well in polls and was contesting the election -in fact it won). Hence, as both dominant parties opposed
the more permissive reform, and given that they had enough seats in the Parliament (a result of the less
proportional rule of 1993) to block it, no reform took place.33 The same scenario (but with a di¤erent
outcome) was replayed in the successful electoral reform of 2001, where the 1993 rule was substituted
by a more permissive one (applying the Sainte-Laguë formula with no exclusion quota). But this time,
the winner of previous elections the Solidarity Electoral Action (that had received almost a third of
the votes and was the largest party in the Parliament, followed by the SLD the other dominant party)
was expected to perform very poorly in the forthcoming elections and lose more than half of its electoral
power. And, since it had the largest group in the Parliament, this time it coalesced with the smaller parties
(which preferred a more permissive rule) in order to pass the reform.34 Hence, this permissive reform
strengthens our argument on the strategic triviality of permissive reforms as opposed to majoritarian
ones. The former, as the 1997/2001 incidence revealed, occurred once the largest parliamentary party
(the Solidarity Electoral Action in this case) was expected to su¤er big loses in the forthcoming elections.
The latter, instead, required strategic cooperation among the two dominant parties (and su¢ cient electoral
uncertainty) in order to be enacted, exactly as our model suggests. This is perhaps one of the reasons
why majoritarian reforms are less likely to occur (as strategic alignment is not always guaranteed) but
also constitute the most interesting cases as well.
33As Benoit and Hayden (2004) note [...] the Againstside [...] paired essentially the two key rival forces in the party
system.This odd alliance was formed for no other reason than pure opportunistic motivations: to maintain the status-quo
that served them both.
34As Benoit and Hayden (2004) note [ASWs] actual seats made [it] the largest group in the Sejm [Parliament], but
according to the polls [...] [they] know that a non-proportional electoral law will destroy them.
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7.4.3 Lithuania and Romania
Nevertheless, Poland is not the only case among the newly-established east European democracies that
o¤ers a test-bed for our theory. A similar pattern emerges if one studies the cases of electoral reforms
in Lithuania and Romania. For instance in Romania, a series of majoritarian electoral reforms that
took place in the last two decades are also consistent with our theoretical framework. After a very brief
post-communist transition period where a pure list-PR rule was applied, as Pilet and De Waele (2007)
note, [...] the story of the Romanian electoral system is the story of a movement to make the electoral
law less inclusive.This attempt included the introduction of exclusion quotas (1992) which have been
subsequently raised (2000) and a series of (successful) proposals to change the rule into a more majoritarian
one (2008) which eventually gained ground among Romanian politicians representing the two dominant
parties (the post-communist Social Democratic Party and the National Liberal Alliance). Moreover, in all
those instances the authors conclude that [...] the main motivation pushing for a less inclusive electoral
law [...] appears [to be] that the largest Romanian parties hope the reform will strengthen their political
representation. Pilet and De Waele (2007) also conclude that increased electoral uncertainty and the
strategic incentives (and coordination) of the two big parties where the drivers behind electoral rule
choice in Romania. Four years later (2012), the circumstances under which the Mixed-Member (MM)
electoral system was replaced by the even more majoritarian (and more restrictive) UK-style, rst-past-
the-post (FPTP) system with single-member districts are strikingly similar. Supported by both dominant
parties, which were both expected to well in the forthcoming elections and maintain their positions, the
new electoral rule was approved by both chambers of the Romanian Parliament.35
A similar pattern also emerges if one is to consider the two majoritarian electoral reforms that took
place in Lithuania in 1996 and 2000, respectively. As Martinaitis (2012) notes, in both instances the
electoral rule became more restrictive as a result of the strategic coordination of the two dominant
political blocs which [...] sought to avoid competition from smaller challengerparties by reducing the
proportionality of the mixed electoral system between 1992 and 2000.Hence, both the pattern of electoral
reform in Lithuania throughout the 1990s, as well as the series of electoral reforms in Romania over the
last two decades appear to be consistent with the theoretical framework that we have developed.
35The reform was approved both by Romanias Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in May 2012, with the support of
the two bigger parties. Despite being later rejected by the Constitutional Court, the acceptance of the new rule by both
chambers in the parliament shows the strategic coordination between the two dominant parties.
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7.4.4 Taiwan and South Korea
But it is not only in east Europe that those patterns of electoral reform have emerged. The 2005 electoral
reform in Taiwan, where the semi-proportional SNTV system (with multi-member districts and a list-PR
allocation) was replaced by the more majoritarian, parallel Mixed-Member system (with single-member
districts decided by simple plurality and no compensatory link between the nominal and the list tiers),
in another example of strategic collusion between the two dominant parties. As Stockton (2009) notes,
in the case of Taiwan, [...] reform was the result of collaboration between arch political rivals, the KMT
[Chinese Nationalist Party] and DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] in an attempt to diminish the
inuence of smaller parties and the incidence of coalition governments. In fact, both parties desired a
more majoritarian system and agreed to introduce a large party bonusas they both sought to create a
two-party system. A similar pattern appears in the majoritarian reform in South Korea (2003) which also
introduced the parallelMixed-Member system. In this instance, as well, the reform was driven once
more by the dominant parties and their desire to create a majoritarian two-party system and consolidate
their position. Overall, in both cases the role of dominant parties, without whom those majoritarian
reforms would not have been possible, was crucial in understanding the dynamics behind this wave of
majoritarian reforms (Stockton 2009).As a result, this move to more majoritarian systems has given rise
to single party majorities in Taiwan and South Korea, as the old dominant parties had regained majority
status in their respective national assemblies by 2008 (Stockton 2009).
7.4.5 Italy
Finally, two attempts for introducing a more majoritarian electoral rule in Italy, in 1999 and 2014 respec-
tively, are also characterized by the same strategic motivations of dominant parties as outlined above. In
the rst instance (1999) it was a failed attempt to replace the Mixed-Member proportional electoral rule
(with a compensatory PR-list) with a pure FPTP system with single-member districts. This attempt
was strongly supported by both dominant Italian political parties as it was deemed that it would benet
them greatly but was defeated in a referendum.36 In any case, despite its narrow defeat, this attempted
reform to substitute the MMP system with the FPTP was suggestive of the incentives of the dominant
parties to coordinate in order to consolidate their positions and reduce the impact that smaller parties
have in government formation. A similar logic is behind the attempted current electoral reform. Ital-
36Technically, 91.5% of the voters who participated in the referendum, following the endorsements by all major political
parties in favour of the FPTP reform, approved it but, the necessary quorum for the referendum to be valid was not met
(participation rate was 49.6 instead of 50%).
30
ian PM Renzi, leader of the biggest Italian party, has agreed with Berlusconi, the leader of the largest
oppositional party and former PM, to introduce a large seat premium (bonus) that is allocated to the
party (or coalition) that wins the plurality in order to guarantee its parliamentary majority. Despite some
initial opposition in the Senate, the reform has cleared Italys lower house of parliament in March and,
irrespective of its nal outcome, it is a clear exhibition of the incentives of the two major Italian political
parties (Democratic Party/PD and Forza Italia) to collude in order to introduce a majoritarian electoral
reform that will allow them to command the parliamentary majority provided that they win the election.
Overall, all these case-studies aimed at highlighting the exact mechanism and the strategic motivations
that are behind many actual electoral reforms that took place in the last twenty years and are consistent
with the theoretical framework that we have developed in this paper. While there are certainly many
cases of electoral reform that our brief account here did not include, our analysis thus far has illustrated
the historic and empirical relevance of our formal model.
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Figure 9. Parliamentary majority (actual vs. predicted) and the incidence of single-party 
government: Greek electoral data (1981-2009). 
 
  
  Figure 10. Utility ui for party i as a function of its seat share si.  
TABLE IV.   ESTIMATES ON THE GOODNESS OF THE FIT BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND THE PREDICTED 
(EQUILIBRIUM) VALUES OF THE LOSEMORE-HANBY INDEX OF ELECTORAL RULE DISPROPORTIONALITY
Dependent Variable Electoral Rule Disproportionality (measured by the Losemore-Hanby index)
OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Predicted Losemore-Hanby index 0.434 -0.077 0.734 0.170 0.867 0.132 0.967 0.199
(0.145)*** (0.103) (0.200)*** (0.095)* (0.224)*** (0.056)** (0.243)*** (0.078)**
Additional controls? Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Country fixed effects? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size? v3<1 /3 Full v3<1 /3 Full v3<1 /3 Full v3<1 /3 Full
R2 0.10 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.55 0.24 0.60 0.29
No of obs. 165 302 160 302 160 302 151 285
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level reported in parentheses. The predicted Losemore-Hanby index is calculated for the symmetric case. A 
variable indicating the margin of electoral victory (in %) is included as a control in all specifications throughout columns 1 to 8. The restricted sample 
includes the cases where there are only two dominant parties and the cumulative sum of vote shares of non-dominant parties is less than one-third (that is, v3 
<1/3).  Other controls include: a dummy variable indicating a country with high institutional constraints (see Comparative Political Data Set I for a  
detailed definition), a dummy variable indicating whether a country has a tradition of coalition governments and a dummy variable indicating the type of  
democratic regime (parliamentary vs. presidential). 
TABLE V. Greek Legislative Elections and Optimal Majority Premium (1981-2009)
Election Vote Shares Actual Seats Seat share Majority Premium l Majority Premium l* Premium Gap
Year V 1 V 2 V 3 (winner) S 1 (actual) (actual) (predicted) (predicted) (l-l*)
1981 0.48 0.36 0.16 172 0.57 21 54 15 42 12
1985 0.46 0.41 0.13 161 0.54 10 44 6 35 8
1989 0.44 0.39 0.17 145 0.48 -6 22 6 43 -21
1989 0.46 0.41 0.13 148 0.49 -3 17 6 35 -17
1990 0.47 0.40 0.14 151 0.50 0 19 9 36 -16
1993 0.47 0.39 0.14 170 0.57 19 55 9 36 19
1996 0.41 0.38 0.20 162 0.54 11 64 3 51 13
2000 0.44 0.43 0.13 158 0.53 7 47 0 36 12
2004 0.45 0.41 0.14 165 0.55 14 53 5 37 16
2007 0.42 0.38 0.20 152 0.51 1 46 4 50 -5
2009 0.44 0.33 0.23 160 0.53 9 50 12 55 -5
Average 0.45 0.39 0.16 158.55 0.53 8 43 7 41 2
